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On Discounting Regulatory Benefits:
Risk, Money, and Intergenerational Equity
Cass R. Sunsteint and Arden Rowellt
There is an elaborate debate over the practice of "discounting" regulatory benefits, such as
environmentalimprovements and decreasedrisks to health and life, when those benefits will not be
enjoyed until some future date. Economists tend to think that, as a general rule, such benefits
should be discounted in the same way as money; many philosophers and lawyers doubt that conclusion on empiricaland normative grounds. Both sides frequently neglect a simple point: if regulators are interested in how people currently value risks that will not come to fruitionfor a significant time, they can use people's current willingness to pay to reduce those risks.And if the question
involves people's willingness to pay in the future, what is being discounted is merely money, not
regulatory benefits as such. No one seeks to discount health and life as such-only the money that
might be used to reduce threats to these goods. If willingness to pay to reduce risk is the appropriate metric for allocating regulatory resources, discounting merely adjusts that metric to make expenditures comparable through time. To be sure, cost-benefit analysis with discounting can produce serious problems of intergenerationalequity; but those problems, involving the obligationsof
the present to the future, require an independentanalysis. Failingto discount will often hurt, rather
than help, future generations,and solutions to the problem of intergenerationalequity should not
be conflated with the question of whether to discount.

I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that a proposed regulation will not produce benefits for
many years; suppose too that an agency is asked to engage in some
form of cost-benefit analysis before it proceeds with the regulation.
Future monetary costs will be discounted on the theory that a dollar
today is worth more than a dollar in twenty years. But what should the
agency do about such future benefits as improved health or averted
deaths? Should these too be discounted, or should a death in 2025 be
treated the same as a death today?
In terms of ultimate outcomes, the choice matters a great deal. If
an agency chooses not to discount, the benefits calculation will shift
dramatically from what it would be if the agency chooses a discount
t Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of
Political Science, University of Chicago.
ft Associate, Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle, Washington. Thanks to Blake Roberts for excellent
research assistance; to Matthew Adler, Robert Hahn, Bernard Harcourt, John Morrall, Eric
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rate of, for example, 10 percent. If a human life is valued at $8 million,
and no discount rate is applied, a life saved 100 years from now is
worth the same expenditure today as a life saved now: $8 million. But
at a discount rate of 10 percent, the same life would justify a modern
expenditure of only $581.' For a regulation whose effects would be felt
centuries from now, any reasonable discount rate will reduce apparently substantial benefits to close to nothing.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) suggests that
agencies should prepare analyses using rates of both 3 percent and 7
percent,' departing from its suggested 10 percent rate in the 1980s. But
these numbers remain controversial.' Consider the fact that the midpoint-5 percent-would ensure that, if a human life is valued at $8
million, 100 deaths in 100 years would be worth only $6.25 million
today. The point has obvious implications for problems with long time
horizons, such as global climate change. If the most serious effects of
climate change will be felt in 2100 or beyond, a decision to discount at
any significant rate-even 3 percent-will dramatically reduce the

monetized gain of emissions reduction strategies.'
In any case, agencies are not bound by OMB guidelines, and in
recent years, their own rates have ranged from as low as 3 percent
(Food and Drug Administration, Department of Housing and Urban
Development) to as high as 10 percent (Environmental Protection
Agency).' In fact, the same agency sometimes uses different discount
rates for no apparent reason. The EPA, for example, used the 10 percent rate for regulating emissions from locomotives, but selected 7
1 See Michael Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation, 92 Nw U L
Rev 706, 742-43 (1998) (applying these figures for the value of a discounted human life in the
context of waste management).
2
See Martin L. Weitzman, "Just Keeping Discounting, But...", in Paul R. Portney and
John P. Weyant, eds, Discounting and IntergenerationalEquity 23, 23 (Resources for the Future
1999) (noting that any reasonable discount rate will make events a few centuries from now not
count at all).
3 For the 7 percent rate, see Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-94, Guidelines
and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs8 (1992), available at 57 Fed
Reg 53519, 53523 (1992). For a more recent suggestion that agencies use both 3 percent and 7
percent, see Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis 33-34 (2003),
online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf (visited Jan 23,2007).
4
See Richard W Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U Chi L Rev 1345, 1370-71 (2003)
(criticizing discount rates greater than 5 percent as far above the consumption rate of interest of 2
or 3 percent, which most economists believe is the appropriate rate for discounting future benefits).
5 For an illuminating discussion, see generally Frank Ackerman and Ian Finlayson, The
Economics of Inaction on Climate Change: A Sensitivity Analysis (Global Development and
Environment Institute Working Paper No 06-07, 2006), online at http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdael
Pubs/wp/06-07EconomicsInaction.pdf (visted Jan 23,2007).
6
See Edward R. Morrison, Comment, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-BenefitAnalysis, 65 U Chi L Rev 1333,1366-67 (1998).
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percent for regulating drinking water and 3 percent for regulating
lead-based paint.! In this domain, government practice is erratic. Key
questions are therefore: What discount rate, if any, should agencies
choose?' Do life and health require some special discount rate or no
discount rate at all? What is the relationship between discount rates
and the rights and interests of future generations?
We shall attempt to make progress on these questions by offering
two claims. The first claim is that if the interests of future generations
are put to one side, and if we focus solely on risks faced by those now
living, regulatory benefits should be discounted at the same rate as
money, and for a simple reason: existing valuations depend on willingness to pay, and discounting those valuations is simply a matter of dis-

counting money.! There are two different possibilities here. Suppose,
first, that regulators are interested in establishing how much people
currently are willing to pay to reduce risks that will not materialize for
a long time. (For example, the question may involve people's current
exposure to levels of arsenic that create a 1/100,000 risk of cancer
twenty years hence.) If so, they should measure people's present willingness to pay to eliminate future harms, and use that figure for purposes of valuation."o In that event, the government is not itself discounting; it is incorporating the discount rates of the people it is attempting to protect. Suppose, second, that regulators are interested in
people's future willingness to pay to reduce risks. (The question may
involve people's exposure, twenty years hence, to levels of arsenic that
will create a 1/100,000 risk of cancer twenty years from that time.) If
7

Id at 1337.

8 Valuable treatments include Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 Colum L Rev 941, 977-81 (1999) (discussing

discount rates as part of an agency's cost-benefit analysis of regulations and analyzing how circumstances should affect the choice of discount rate); Morrison, Comment, 65 U Chi L Rev at
1348-49 (cited in note 6) ("As a threshold matter, it seems unreasonable for agencies not to
discount benefits to future generations in their cost-benefit analyses of proposed rules.").
9 We do not attempt to specify the appropriate monetary discount rate. For discussion, see
generally Portney and Weyant, eds, Discounting and IntergenerationalEquity (cited in note 2)

(compiling the views of twenty economists concerning the purpose, utility, and determination of
discount rates). See also Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 150-55 (Oxford
2004) (demonstrating that the weight given to the welfare of future generations affects the determination of discount rates); Daniel Farber and Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the
Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 Vand L Rev 267, 289-96

(1993) (assessing the use of discount rates in regulation particularly with regard to environmental policy); William J. Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 Am Econ Rev 788,789-96

(1968) (identifying the appropriate discount rate for a public project as that which correctly
gauges the social opportunity cost of the project).
to If there is inadequate information, or a problem of bounded rationality such as myopia,
existing figures might be questioned. But this problem does not involve governmental "discounting"; it involves using, and if necessary correcting, individual assignments of monetary values for
benefits that will be enjoyed in the future.
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so, money is what will be spent in the future, and it makes sense to
discount money. So long as valuations are based on private willingness
to pay, there is no special problem with discounting money; any objection is to the use of willingness to pay, not to discounting as such.
The second claim is that while cost-benefit analysis with discounting can produce serious problems of intergenerational equity, these
problems are not best addressed by refusing to discount. We will show
that under identifiable circumstances, regulatory decisions based on
discounting will produce morally unjustified actions by the present
generation at the expense of posterity. But refusing to discount does
not solve this problem; in many cases, it will injure, rather than promote, the interests of future generations. The task of fulfilling the obligations owed by the present to the future is exceedingly important,
but it is not appropriately handled by a refusal to discount. We shall
attempt to clarify the nature of those obligations while also showing the
need to distinguish them from the separate question of discounting.
To understand these claims, and their implications for regulatory
agencies, reviewing courts, and the general idea of "sustainable development," we need to back up a bit.
II. DEBATES
Everyone agrees that money should be discounted. The simplest
reason is that it can be invested and made to grow. It is better to have
$1000 today than $1000 in ten years, if only because $1000 today can
be made to be worth much more than $1000 a decade hence. But for
life and health as such, discounting is greatly disputed in both theory
and practice. In an important case, a federal court said that discounting is necessary to provide an "apples-to-apples comparison" of costs
and benefits, suggesting that agencies are legally required to use the
same discount rate for health and safety benefits as for dollars." Other
decisions have insisted on careful explanations for whatever discount
rates agencies choose.1 Economists tend to believe that the argument
for discounting is obvious, though the consensus has started to unravel

11 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA, 947 F2d 1201,1218 (5th Cir 1991) (noting that if an
agency chooses to discount the effects of a regulation, it must discount not only the costs, but the
benefits as well, in an attempt to avoid skewed results).
12

Compare Natural Resources Defense Council v Herrington, 768 F2d 1355, 1413-14 (DC

Cir 1985) (rejecting the Department of Energy's 10 percent discount rate because it was conclusory and because the Department did not carefully establish its discount rate or explain its decision "intelligently"), with Northern California Power Agency v FERC, 37 F3d 1517,1522-24 (DC

Cir 1994) (holding the FERC's use of a uniform discount rate for both private and public consumers to be sufficiently supported).
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in the last decade." Philosophers 4 and lawyers 5 are often skeptical
about discounting. Philosophers have raised serious doubts about the
idea that a future death or illness should be discounted in the same
way as money.6 Lawyers as well have questioned that idea, suggesting
that it depends on contentious empirical or normative assumptions."
A. Objections and Paradoxes
A central objection is that a life in 2025 does not seem to be
"worth less" than a life today. If ten people are killed twenty years
hence, the outcome is not worse than if ten people are killed tomorrow.
Thus one critic asks: "What is wrong with discounting numbers of lives
saved? One obvious problem is that death does not recognize human
accounting conventions and death does not discount."" In the same vein,
Ackerman and Heinzerling object that "the choice implicit in discounting
13

See Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation:A Response to the Critics,71

U Chi L Rev 1021,1026-27 (2004) (arguing for discounting because "consumers are not indifferent between consuming a dollar today and a dollar next year," and rejecting arguments for either
a lower discount rate than commonly used or no discount rate); John J. Donohue III, Why We
Should Discount the Views of Those Who Discount Discounting,108 Yale L J 1901, 1903 (1998)

(arguing that discounting is essential to better regulation because it "helps [agencies] to rationalize their regulatory agenda and enables independent analysts to evaluate the soundness of particular regulations"). Various positions are presented in Portney and Weyant, eds, Discounting
and IntergenerationalEquity (cited in note 2), with recognition of some of the underlying complexities. See generally Paul R. Portney and John P.Weyant, Introduction,in Portney and Weyant,
eds, Discounting and IntergenerationalEquity 1, 5 (cited in note 2) (stressing in particular "the

unease even the best minds of the profession feel about discounting, due to the technical complexity of the issues and to their ethical ramifications").
14
See Tyler Cowen and Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in Peter Laslett and
James S. Fishkin, eds, Justice between Age Groups and Generations 144, 148 (Yale 1992) (finding

unpersuasive the philosophical argument for discounting on the ground that the correlation
between discounting and future social benefit is imperfect and based on faulty logic); Derek
Parfit, Reasons and Persons 357 (Oxford 1984) (arguing that "the Social Discount Rate is indefensible" because "[tihe present moral importance of future events does not decline at a rate of n
per cent per year").
15 See Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing 186-87 (New Press 2004) (arguing against discounting because
certain problems, like climate change, may become irreversible and thus not be adequately addressed if discounting is applied, and because the market cannot tell individuals how to make
tradeoffs between the present and distant generations); Sidney A. Shapiro and Robert L.
Glicksman, Risk Regulation at Risk: Restoring a PragmaticApproach 118-19 (Stanford 2003);

Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless, 150 U Pa L Rev 1553, 1570-73 (2002)
(criticizing discounting as undervaluing future generations and environmental protection).
16 See Cowen and Parfit, Against the Social DiscountRate at 160 (cited in note 14) (arguing
that a genetic deformity twenty years from now is not "worth" less than a genetic deformity
today; by contrast, a dollar twenty years from now is worth less than a dollar today).
17 See Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 977 (cited in note 8) (arguing that the methodology
currently used to establish the discount rate, which holds the utility derived from living constant
over time, overstates that rate).
1s
Parker, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1374 (cited in note 4) (asserting that "discounting lives is
misleading," as the value placed on future welfare is a moral choice, not an economic one).

HeinOnline -- 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 175 2007

The University of Chicago Law Review

176

[74:171

is between preventing harms to the current generation and preventing
similar harms to future generations. Seen in this way, discounting looks
like a fancy justification for foisting our problems off onto the people
who come after us."" They emphasize that with "a discount rate of five
percent, for example, the death of a billion people 500 years from now
becomes less serious than the death of one person today."20
Defenders of discounting have responded that a refusal to use a
discount rate creates a number of logical and practical conundrums.
For instance, a refusal to discount might require truly extraordinary
sacrifices from the present for the sake of the (infinite) future. On one
view, the failure to discount would leave all generations at a subsistence level of existence, because benefits would be postponed perpetually for the future.2 1 "Negative discount rates would mean that we
should always postpone consumption now in favour of consumption
tomorrow, leaving current generations perhaps at some subsistence
level of consumption. Worse, the postponement is perpetual."" At the
very least, a zero discount rate might "bias[] cost-benefit analysis in favor of rules that impose excessive sacrifices on the current generation." 3
On the other hand, it has been argued that a failure to discount
the monetized equivalent of regulatory benefits would lead to less
regulation, not more. If regulators are indifferent between lives saved
now and lives saved in the future, but discount costs at some positive
rate, then it makes sense for them to delay life-saving expenditures
indefinitely, simply because the cost-benefit ratio will (always) be better in the future. Under this view, "the discounting of costs but not
benefits ... has a paralyzing effect on a decisionmaker.... For any

attractive program, there is always a superior delayed program which
should be funded first. The result is that no program with a finite starting date can be selected."24
19

Ackerman and Heinzerling, 150 U Pa L Rev at 1571 (cited in note 15).

20

Id.

See David Pearce and R. Kelly Turner, Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment 223-24 (Hopkins 1990) (arguing that with a negative discount rate, current generations
would remain in subsistence because consumption would always be postponed until tomorrow).
21

22

Id.

2

Morrison, Comment, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1349 (cited in note 6).

24

Emmett B. Keeler and Shan Cretin, Discounting of Life-Saving and Other Nonmonetary

Effects, 29 Mgmt Sci 300, 303 (1983) (arguing that regulators will never enact programs if they
discount costs but not benefits). The argument is criticized in Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 989-92
(cited in note 8) (arguing that, in the context of environmental problems, a failure to act in the
present could yield exponentially worse or irreversible problems in the future, because "costs
and damages would vary over time if the problem[s] were left unattended").
Ackerman and Heinzerling discuss Keeler and Cretin's claim and reject it, in part on the
ground that allowing numerous current deaths would be politically unacceptable. See Ackerman
and Heinzerling, Priceless at 193-94 (cited in note 15). But the claim is one of the logical implica-
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In any case, defenders of discounting have argued that instead of
discounting lives as such, regulators might simply use the future discounted (monetary) cost of saving lives at the time when the lives are
saved-an approach that is mathematically identical and hence produces the same analysis." Summarizing a range of arguments, a general overview suggests that failure to permit a discount rate will ensure that any cost-benefit analysis "fails to account for the opportunity
cost of resources that are diverted from private investment toward
investment in the proposed rule," and could therefore "lead the
agency to adopt rules that reduce the welfare of future generations,
because the resources could have been invested in assets with higher
rates of return." 2 But for good reasons, these arguments have yet to
convince the numerous critics of discounting. As we shall see, it is by
no means clear that the relevant resources will be "invested" for the
benefit of future generations.
Responding to the controversy, some prominent analysts have
distinguished between "descriptive" and "prescriptive" approaches.V
Under descriptive approaches, the discount rate is chosen by examining the rate of return to capital that has been invested in a range of
possible assets. This is the standard approach of those who advocate

tions of refusing to discount, and the fact that it entails a politically unacceptable outcome does
not mean that it is wrong.
2
See, for example, John F. Morrall III, Saving Lives: A Review of the Record, 27 J Risk &
Uncertainty 221, 229-30 (2003) (analyzing data regarding "[o]pportunity costs per statistical life
saved" for different agency regulations).
26
Morrison, Comment, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1349 (cited in note 6) (arguing that policy judgments and methodology "dictate the choice between the two competing approaches to discounting"). This argument has been used by OMB itself, see OMB, Circular A-4 at 35 (cited in note 3),
and it is the closest to the argument we make here. But if our argument is correct, it is unnecessary to speak of opportunity costs, because what is being discounted is the monetary value of the
risk itself. For questions of intergenerational equity, the argument from opportunity costs is
insufficient, because we do not know that those savings will be invested for posterity's benefit
rather than consumed. See Cowen and Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate at 152 (cited in
note 14) ("When benefits to be consumed are received later, this may involve no opportunity
costs."). Note that many people believe that future risks are unlikely to come to fruition because
new technologies will permit us to prevent them. As later discussed in the text, however, this is
not a point about discounting itself
27
See William Cline, Discounting for the Very Long Term, in Portney and Weyant, Discounting and IntergenerationalEquity 131, 135, 137-39 (cited in note 2) (discussing the differences between the prescriptive and descriptive approaches and proposing a "workable compromise for intergenerational discounting"); K.J. Arrow, et al, IntertemporalEquity, Discounting,and
Economic Efficiency, in James P. Bruce, Hoesung Lee, and Erik F. Haites, eds, Climate Change
1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change 125, 131-34 (Cambridge 1996) ("The
prescriptive approach, which is usually associated with a relatively low discount rate, begins with
a social welfare function . . . constructed from ethical principles," while "[tihe descriptive approach implicitly aims to maximize the economic resources available to future generations,
allowing them to decide how to use these resources.").
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discounting." Under prescriptive approaches, the discount rate is selected on the basis of ethical judgments about the duties of one generation to those that succeed it. These approaches can lead to dramatically different rates.2 9 But there is a serious difficulty with this distinction: any descriptive approach must ultimately be defended in prescriptive terms. It remains disputed whether the best prescriptive arguments require abandonment of what emerges from the preferred
descriptive approach.
B.

Building on Preferences

An alternative possibility is to attempt to bracket the moral debates by investigating people's actual preferences in this domain.,
Emphasizing the importance of those preferences, some defenders of
discounting have attempted to show that people do discount future
lives and the interests of future generations. On a standard view, "a
zero discount rate is inconsistent with the observable behavior of individuals, which is arguably the best guide for policy in a democratic
state."3' The word "arguably" suggests the normative problem in this
context: why should the interests of future generations be determined
by consulting the preferences of the present generation? Those preferences might well be self-interested. Even if there is a degree of altruism, there is no reason to think that the (bounded) altruism of the
present should settle the moral entitlements of the future.3
In any case, individual preferences in this context are not easy to
identify, and they appear to be subject to framing effects. In an influential paper, Maureen Cropper and her coauthors conclude that people are indifferent between saving one life today and saving forty-five
28
See, for example, Robert C. Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues Relating to the Discount
Rate for Evaluating National Energy Options, in Robert C. Lind, et al, eds, Discountingfor Time
and Futurein Energy Policy 21 (Resources for the Future 1982).

29 See Portney and Weyant, Introductionat 4 (cited in note 13) ("[The prescriptive approach
will result in the selection of a lower discount rate than would result from the use of the descriptive
approach."). A helpful overview can be found in Her Majesty's Treasury, Stem Review: The Economics
of Climate Change 31-32,41-52 (2006), online at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independentreviews/
stern_review economicsclimateschange/sternreviewindex.cfm (visited Jan 29,2007).
30 See Raymond J. Kopp and Paul R. Portney, Mock Referenda and IntergenerationalDeci-

sionmaking, in Portney and Weyant, Discountingand IntergenerationalEquity 87,91-92 (cited in

note 2) (arguing for mock referenda that take the citizenry's actual preferences into account).
31 Morrison, Comment, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1349 (cited in note 6).
32 See Stern Review at 31 (cited in note 29) (noting that "it is possible that people actually
do place less value on the welfare of future generations" but that "it is hard to see any ethical
justification for this"). This objection raises serious questions about the approach in Kopp and
Portney, Mock Referenda and IntergenerationalDecisionmaking (cited in note 30). For a related

criticism of democratic arguments for discounting, see Cowen and Parfit, Against the Social
Discount Rate at 146 (cited in note 14) ("When those affected have no vote, the appeal to democracy provides no answer.").
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lives in one hundred years-a conclusion that, if sound, would have
concrete implications for the appropriate discount rate.' The conclusion was based on a study that asked people whether they would prefer a program that saves "100 people now" or one that saves a substantially larger number "100 years from now." Yet other ways of
framing the same problem yield radically different results. For example, most people consider "equally bad" a single death from pollution
next year and a single death from pollution in 100 years -a finding that
implies no preference for members of the current generation. Measurements of people's judgments about obligations to future generations
are influenced by framing effects." For this reason, it is far from clear
that judgments about discounting can be rooted in actual preferences.
C. Health versus Money, Latent Harms versus Future Generations
Within the legal literature, the most influential and elaborate
treatment of discounting future benefits has been offered by Dean
Richard Revesz.- Revesz makes two central arguments. First, he contends that the primary reasons for discounting monetary benefits do
not apply to risks to life and health. Money is discounted for two reasons: first, it can be invested, and second, most people have a "pure"
time preference for current over future consumption.8 But human
lives cannot be invested, and a life lost twenty years in the future cannot be "recovered" by investing some sum, or some person, in the present. (Human beings cannot be put in banks-or if they can, they are
unlikely to grow there.) Nevertheless, Revesz acknowledges that people may well have a pure time preference that would treat a future
risk as less troublesome than a present risk.39 Michael Moore and W.
33 Maureen L. Cropper, et al, Preferences for Life Saving Programs:How the Public Discounts Time and Age, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty 243, 244, 254 (1993) (stating that individuals' "discount rate for lives saved is almost as high as their real discount rate for money").
3
See Shane Frederick, Measuring Intergenerational Time Preference: Are Future Lives
Valued Less?, 26 J Risk & Uncertainty 39, 40-41, 43 (2003) (describing the results of a study that
used seven different methods to assess "intergenerational time preferences," each of which
yielded "dramatically different" results).
35 For a similar result, see Jonathan Baron, Can We Use Human Judgments To
Determine
the Discount Rate?, 20 Risk Analysis 861, 862 (2000) (noting that the problem of basing discount
rates on human judgments is that such judgments elicit "dramatically inconsistent results").
36
See generally Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev 941 (cited in note 8).
37
Id at 974-77 ("I can invest $100 today at a 3.5% interest rate and have about $200 in
twenty years. I cannot invest the utility that I derive from living a year at present and obtain,
twenty years later, the utility that I would then derive from living two years.").
38
For a suggestion that a pure time preference is irrational, see Cowen and Parfit, Against
the Social Discount Rate at 154-55 (cited in note 14) (reporting that, though it is irrational, many
people prefer to have benefits accrue to them sooner rather than later, even if they know that
this will make the benefits smaller).
39
Revesz,99 Colum L Rev at 997-1002 (cited in note 8).
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Kip Viscusi, for example, have investigated the empirical question, and
find a real discount rate of about 2 percent, one that "accords roughly
with financial market interest rates for the period, once these nominal
rates are adjusted for inflation." Revesz argues that the existence of
such a time preference justifies some discount rate for future harms
that will occur to people now living."
To see the practical implication, consider the case of arsenic regulation. In its rationale for the regulation, the EPA treats an arsenic
death in the future as equivalent to an arsenic death in the present,
even though an arsenic death is likely to come, if it does come, decades after current exposures.42 Revesz's argument suggests that the
EPA's refusal to discount the latent harms from arsenic exposure is
wrong, even arbitrary; some kind of discount rate is clearly appropriate.
But Revesz does not argue that the EPA should adopt a discount rate
that is equivalent to the appropriate discount rate for money. He contends, not implausibly, that there is no reason in the abstract to think
that the time preference for health risks is the same as the time preference for dollars; and because there is no investment opportunity, any
discount rate for health risks may well be smaller than the market rate
of return typically used to discount money. Hence the use of a market
rate of return, on Revesz's view, is likely to produce a significant under43
valuation of regulatory benefits that will be enjoyed in the future. This
is an important conclusion, because it suggests that current government
practice should be substantially changed in a way that would justify a
number of regulations that cannot now satisfy a cost-benefit test.
Second, Revesz contends that it is important to distinguish between latent harms and risks to future generations." An environmentally induced illness today is worse than an environmentally induced
illness in twenty years; it is for this reason that some kind of discount
Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, Discounting Environmental Health Risks: New
Evidence and Policy Implications, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt S-51, S-61 (1990) (analyzing a "calculation of the value of longevity using a willingness to pay approach").
41
Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 984 (cited in note 8) (arguing that such a discount rate reflects that individuals derive less utility from a year in the future than from a present year).
40

42 National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance
and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed Reg 6976, 7013 (2001), codified at 40 CFR

§§ 9,141,142:
Although the [EPA's Science Advisory Board] recommended accounting for latency in a
primary benefits analysis, the [EPA] believe[s] that, in the absence of any sound scientific
evidence on the duration of particular latency periods for arsenic related cancers, discounted benefits estimates are more appropriately accounted for in a sensitivity analysis.
43 See Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 983 (cited in note 8) (noting that OMB's approach to
discounting undervalues human life, as it fails to account for economic growth).
See id at 987 ("[I]t is not defensible to argue that the value assigned by the regulatory
4
process to a human life should be independent of when an individual's life-years are lost.").
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rate makes a great deal of sense for latent harms. But for risks to future generations, Revesz believes that the argument for discounting is
much more fragile Why should a death of a ten-year-old in 2040
count less than a death of a ten-year-old today? Revesz concludes that
there is no good answer to this question, and hence that the standard
idea of discounting is not properly applied to harms faced by members
of future generations."
In its guidance to federal agencies, OMB is alert to Revesz's concerns but disagrees, calling for the same discount rate for money as for
other goods, briskly referring to opportunity costs: "It is true that lives
saved today cannot be invested in a bank to save more lives in the
future. But the resources that would have been used to save those
lives can be invested to earn a higher payoff in future lives saved."47 In
any case, people prefer immediate health gains to equivalent health
gains in the future.4 And because a failure to discount would produce
"perverse" results, OMB suggests that agencies should follow the
"professional consensus that future health effects, including both
benefits and costs, should be discounted at the same rate."" But OMB
errs in suggesting that there is such a consensus.so
III. DISCOUNTING MONEY: THE LAST GENERATION
We believe that both the defenders and the critics of discounting
neglect an exceedingly simple point, one that supports the conclusion
that an apples-to-apples comparison is indeed necessary. The point is
this: willingness to pay is the foundation for valuation, and current
45

See id at 987-1003 (refuting various arguments in favor of discounting risks to future

generations, and asserting that no expenditures would pass a cost-benefit test were such a practice observed).
46 See id at 1005-09 (contending that if the current generation's actions impose costs on
future generations, there is no simple way to compensate these future generations). Revesz does
argue for a limited role for discounting in the intergenerational context, suggesting, for example,
that present generations should not "spend more when we can achieve the same result for less,"
and that present generations might well prefer to face environmental harms in return for "the
fruits of greater investments in technological innovation." Id at 1008. These suggestions are very
much in the spirit of our discussion in Part IV below.
47
OMB, Circular A-4 at 34 (cited in note 3) (concluding that intergenerational discounting
will protect the interests of the current and future generations at the same time).
48

Id (reasoning that this kind of pure time preference makes discounting appropriate).

Id (claiming that, without discounting, attractive investments in health improvements
would be perpetually delayed into the future).
49
5o

OMB overstates the professional consensus. See Portney and Weyant, Introduction at 5

(cited in note 13) (describing "the unease even the best minds of the profession feel about discounting, due to the technical complexity of the issues and to their ethical ramifications"); William

D. Nordhaus, DiscountingandPublic Policies ThatAffect the DistantFuture, in Portney and Weyant,
eds, Discounting and IntergenerationalEquity 145, 149 (cited in note 2) ("[Clonventional benefit-

cost analyses are rules of thumb for decisionmaking.... But they cannot substitute for judgment.").
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willingness to pay can be used to measure both risks that will come to
fruition immediately and risks that will come to fruition in the future.
If future willingness to pay is what is involved, then future money
should be discounted just like other forms of money. Any discount
rate is based on individual preferences, not on government discounting. Individual preferences might be questioned, if (for example) people tend to be myopic, showing little concern for their future selves.
But this issue, involving the possibility of hyperbolic discounting of
the future in general, is the relevant one; it does not involve government discounting of lives and health as such.
To separate this argument from intergenerational issues, to which
we turn in Part IV, let us suppose that the practice of discounting is
proposed, but only for those people who are now living. Imagine that
the question involves the practices of what is, in some part of the
world, the Last Generation-a generation of living people who will
have no successors.
For the Last Generation, the problem is essentially solved by only
one step: acceptance of the claim, now standard in the federal government and not challenged by many critics of discounting, that statis2
tical risks should be turned into monetary equivalents. It is entirely
unnecessary to speak of opportunity costs, as OMB does, or to ask, as
Revesz does, whether the arguments that apply to money also apply to
health and life. The reason is that what is being measured is always
money, and never health or life as such. When agencies apply a discount rate to monetized regulatory benefits, they are discounting the
relevant monetary amounts, not life or health.
To understand this point, it is necessary to see how regulators
translate reductions of risk into monetary amounts. The answer comes
from two kinds of evidence. The first and most important involves
real-world markets, producing evidence of compensation levels for
actual risks." In the workplace and for consumer goods, additional
safety has a price; market evidence is investigated to identify that
51 See Richard Dubourg and David Pearce, Paradigms for Environmental Choice: Sustain-

ability versus Optimality, in Sylvie Faucheux, David Pearce, and John L. Proops, eds, Models of
Sustainable Development 21,24 (Edward Elgar 1996) ("[M]aximizing a single utility function ...
over infinite time cannot help but suggest that we are dealing with a single generation which
exists forever, or even a single individual.").
52 Of course there is a separate controversy over the monetization of risks to health and
life, see Ackerman and Heinzerling, Priceless at 188-91 (cited in note 15) (arguing against the
monetization of risks to health and life, "[slince lives are not money, and do not have a meaningful price"), but that objection to discounting purports to be separate from the controversy.
53 See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk 5945
(Oxford 1992) (analyzing seventeen studies on individuals' risk-dollar tradeoff in the labor market to determine their "implicit value of injury").
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price." The second kind of evidence comes from contingent-valuation
studies, asking people how much they are willing to pay to reduce statistical risks." Both of these approaches are controversial, of course,
and rightly so.M However the controversies are resolved, the use of
these figures grows out of the simple idea that people should not be
forced to pay for risk protection they do not want."
Currently, regulators use this evidence to calculate the amounts
that people are willing to pay to avoid certain categories and levels of
risk.m These amounts produce the "value of a statistical life" (VSL).
Once an agency has identified the relevant studies, the calculation of
VSL is a product of simple arithmetic. The EPA, for instance, relies on
studies of actual workplace risk, attempting to determine how much
workers are paid to assume mortality hazards." If workers must be
paid $600, on average, to eliminate a risk of death of 1/10,000, the VSL
would be said to be $6 million. It should be clear, however, that the
very idea of valuing a statistical life is highly misleading; no one is
"valuing life." The real issue involves the valuation of statistical risks.
It is not accurate to say that a life is being valued at $6 million. It
would be much more accurate to say that for risks of 1/10,000, the average (or median) monetary value in the relevant population is
$600-or that for risks of 1/100,000, the average (or median) monetary
value is $60.
Once regulatory benefits have been monetized in this way, regulators are no longer discounting actual risks to life or health. Instead,
they are using people's willingness to pay to avoid those risks. There
are two possibilities here, and they are analytically distinct. First, regulators might be monetizing both harms that will occur soon and risks
5

A valuable and comprehensive overview can be found in W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E.

Aldy, The Value of a StatisticalLife:A CriticalReview of Market Estimates throughout the World,

27 J Risk & Uncertainty 5,5 (2003) (reviewing "evidence on market choices that involve implicit
tradeoffs between risk and money" to determine the value of a statistical life, which can "provide
governments with a reference point for assessing the benefits of risk reduction efforts").
55 See, for example, James Hammitt and Jin-Tau Liu, Effects of Disease Type and Latency
on the Value of Mortality Risk, 28 J Risk & Uncertainty 73,74 (2004) ("We use contingent valuation (CV) to test for effects of disease type and latency on individual willingness to pay (WTP)
to reduce risks of developing a fatal cancer or other chronic, degenerative disease through exposure to environmental pollution.").
56 See Ackerman and Heinzerling, 150 U Pa L Rev at 1522-78 (cited in note 15) (criticizing
the monetization of risks for numerous reasons, most notably that human life is invaluable).
5
Of course this claim would not justify current practice if the figures are based on a lack of
information or bounded rationality. For discussion of some of the complexities here, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Valuing Life:A Pleafor Disaggregation,54 Duke L J 385,403 (2004) (arguing that willing-

ness to pay numbers are relevant only if they "reflect a rational tradeoff by informed workers").
58 For an overview, see id at 398-400.
59 For further discussion, see Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 74 (cited in note 53) (noting that
this "recognition of the nonpecuniary aspects of life is an important advance").
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that will not turn into harms for a long time ("latent harms"). They
might use current willingness to pay to value both of these. For harms
that will occur soon, existing evidence can be used to measure people's willingness to pay. For risks that will turn into harms in the future, regulators can work with people's current willingness to pay to
eliminate risks that will not materialize until a certain number of years
in the future. Both market evidence and contingent-valuation studies
can be enlisted to determine the appropriate values.
The labor market, for example, exposes people to risks that might
materialize immediately and risks that will not turn into harms until
some time in the future; and in principle, the resulting evidence might
be measured to obtain the appropriate values. In addition, it would be
simple to design a contingent-valuation study to determine people's
current willingness to pay to avoid mortality risks of 1/100,000 that
would come to fruition five, ten, fifteen, and twenty years hence. Of
course, any such evidence would involve people's own discount ratestheir own willingness to pay less (money) for future benefits than for
present benefits. Recall that one study finds a 2 percent discount rate
on the part of ordinary people, one that does not seem obviously irrational, and that can be used without any government discounting at
all." In drawing on evidence of this kind, government is not generating
a special discount rate for mortality or health; instead it is incorporating people's own judgments about the proper monetary valuation of
benefits that will be enjoyed in the future.
To be sure, there are serious practical problems in determining
the relevant values. It is possible that the labor market studies are too
''noisy" to permit confident judgments about current valuations of
future risks. Bounded rationality may create a real problem either for
such studies or for contingent valuation. For reductions in risk that
cannot come to fruition until a decade or more hence, there may be
distinctive kinds of bounded rationality. If, for example, people display
hyperbolic discounting," treating the future as if it were worth very
little, we might not want to use the resulting judgments for purposes of
policy. But these are fairly conventional difficulties with the use of
willingness to pay, and they do not suggest that there are any particular problems with discounting life and health. People may display hyperbolic discounts rates for future money, not merely for future improvements in life and health; and we are speaking here of their curSee generally Moore and Viscusi, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt S-51 (cited in note 40). If
government itself discounted these figures, it would be involved in "double discounting."
61 See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 145 (cited in note 53) (arguing that "individuals are likely
to place an inefficiently low weight on benefits to future generations").
6o
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rent judgments about how much they are willing to pay to reduce future risks. Money is what is involved; discounting is merely a tool that
makes amounts of money comparable through time. The real question
is how to produce usable estimates of people's current willingness to
pay to prevent future harms.
Suppose, however, that regulators are interested not in current
monetary valuation of latent harms, but in future monetary valuations
of such harms. The question might be not how much people are now
willing to pay to prevent a harm that will occur twenty years from
now, but how much people, part of the Last Generation but ten years
hence, will be willing to pay to eliminate a risk that will produce harm
occurring either immediately or still further in the future. (Hence we
must distinguish between future valuations of then-current risks and
future valuations of then-future risks.) Any judgments about the resulting amounts will have a speculative character, of course. Perhaps
regulators should attempt to determine how much people would now
be willing to pay to eliminate the future risks, in which case government itself need not discount at all. Perhaps regulators should attempt
to determine how much people would be willing to pay, in the future,
to eliminate those risks when they are encountered. If regulators attempt the latter approach, they will have to project future income
growth (which will increase valuations). But once the relevant
amounts are generated-and this is the key point-they will be monetary, and they must be discounted.
In discounting these monetized regulatory benefits, regulators are
doing nothing more controversial than discounting money. It is appropriate to discount the money that people will be willing to spend,
twenty years hence, on refrigerators, automobiles, movies, books, education, and medicine. The same is true of the money that people are
willing to spend to avoid risk. All money can be invested and made to
grow. Everyone agrees that for this reason, if for no other, $100 today
is worth more than $100 in twenty years.,
It follows that to produce valuations for the Last Generation,
there is no need to identify logical conundrums or implausible outcomes that seem to follow from a failure to discount. Only two steps
are necessary: an appreciation of the theory that underlies current
practice, and an understanding that what is involved, always, is money,
and not life, health, or the environment as such. To be sure, we have
drawn a distinction between current willingness to pay to reduce future harms and future willingness to pay to reduce future harms.
62
We are putting to one side unusual cases in which, for reasons of self-control or otherwise, people might prefer future money to current money.
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Regulators do not appear to have distinguished between these two
sets of problems, which raise distinctive challenges. But the key point
is that money is involved in both cases.
Return in this light to the question of latent harms, and suppose
that for the Last Generation it is necessary to assign monetary values
to a risk, such as the cancer risk from current consumption of arsenic
in drinking water, that will inflict harm twenty years hence. Suppose
that ordinarily $8 million is the appropriate VSL-that is, suppose that
people are now willing to pay $80 to eliminate a 1/100,000 risk of mortality today, and that the relevant mortality risk is 1/100,000. If the issue is people's current willingness to pay to prevent a 1/100,000 risk
that will not impose harm for twenty years, there is an empirical challenge, which is to elicit that amount. Almost surely, it will be significantly less than $80. It is better to face a 1/100,000 risk of mortality in
twenty years than to face such a risk now.
If the issue is how much people now living will be willing to pay
in twenty years to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000, the resulting amount
must be subject to the appropriate discount rate for money-and
hence a VSL of $10 million, if that is the appropriate amount in
twenty years, must be discounted too. The reason has nothing to do
with discounting life or health; it is that a sum of money in the future
is worth less than the same sum today. Recall that any particular dollar
amount in twenty years is worth some fraction of that figure now not
reason, but because the
for any exotic or theoretically contentious
63
grow.
to
made
and
fraction can be invested
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS

How might this argument be resisted? As we have noted, it is correct to say that national wealth tends to increase over time, and hence
people will likely be wealthier in twenty years than they now are. Because they will be wealthier, they will demand more to be subject to
statistical risks. For this reason, use of the current VSL to calculate
monetary amounts in the future likely produces unjustifiably low numbers." But these are not points against discounting. They simply suggest
People also seem to have a "pure" time preference for money. See Revesz, 99 Colum L
Rev at 958-59 (cited in note 8) (explaining the preference to have money now as opposed to
later so that it can be invested or consumed). For purposes of our treatment here, it is not necessary to distinguish between time preference and investment value.
See Dora L. Costa and Matthew E. Kahn, The Rising Price of Nonmarket Goods, 93 Am
6
Econ Rev Papers & Proc 227, 229 table 1 (2003) (suggesting a likely current value of life of $12
million, based on wage increases over time). In the context of arsenic regulation, the EPA also
noted in its sensitivity analysis that the appropriate adjustment would increase the VSL from
$6.1 million to $6.7 million. 66 Fed Reg at 7013 (cited in note 42) (reflecting an adjustment of the
VSL for real income growth that occurred after the completion of the EPA's wage-risk studies).
63
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that the numbers that must be discounted are higher than regulators
currently recognize. The proper analysis uses a multiplier for national
income growth and any other relevant factors, and applies a discount
rate from that point.
Similarly, it might be argued that agencies are on fragile ground
in using labor market studies to estimate VSL.' Perhaps workers, accepting a $60 premium to face a risk of 1/100,000, are insufficiently
informed, are boundedly rational, or are subject to some form of coercion. Perhaps the proper premium is $70, or $100, or $200. Perhaps the
problem of insufficient information or bounded rationality is especially serious insofar as we are concerned with risks that will not materialize for a long time. Perhaps we cannot entirely trust either market evidence or contingent-valuation studies that generate numbers
for risks that will not come to fruition for a decade or more. If so, we
would have to rethink whatever numbers we have, but discounting
itself would be unaffected. What would be used would be the proper
monetary amounts rather than the improper ones. So long as any
monetary valuation is used, discounting generally follows. To repeat:
when discounting occurs, it is money that is being discounted, not the
goods to which monetary amounts are being assigned.
A separate objection would stress that in the future technological,
medical, and other changes will produce a range of improvements
with respect to health, safety, and the environment. Harms that we
now project, holding current practices constant, might well not materialize, simply because posterity will be in a position to prevent them.
Perhaps climate change will produce less-serious harms than we imagine because adaptation will be possible, or because technology will be
able to reduce warming. This objection is not implausible in itself, but
it is not a claim about discounting. It is true that regulators who are
projecting future harms should attempt to make an accurate projection, and accuracy requires an appreciation of technological innovation. But a "probabilistic discount rate,"" reflecting a judgment about
Note also that wealthier people might not merely be willing to spend more because they are
wealthier; certain goods, such as environmental protection, might be especially appealing to
wealthier people, whose preferences and tastes might change as a result of their relative wealth.
See Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 963-64 (cited in note 8) (asserting that rising income over time
can counteract the decrease in value of future enjoyment of utilities that discounting produces).
65 See Ackerman and Heinzerling, 150 U Pa L Rev at 1562-70 (cited in note 15) (noting
that cost-benefit analysis contains inherent flaws because it monetizes and devalues life in a way
that is "at odds with [ ] common perspectives"). A general discussion can be found in Sunstein,
54 Duke L J at 401-04 (cited in note 57) (questioning reliance on VSL data in light of the fact
that it is wide-ranging and outdated).
6
See Cowen and Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate at 147 (cited in note 14) (arguing
that predictions about the future should be discounted, as the farther off they are the more likely
they are to be false).
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such innovation, should not be confused with the issues of discounting
on which we are focusing here.
A more ambitious counterargument would suggest that the
monetary values of human beings are not the proper basis for valuing
some regulatory benefits. Consider, for example, the continued existence of an endangered species, or the lives of wild horses, tigers, pandas, and elephants. It is controversial (as it should be6 ) to say that endangered species and animals should be valued by aggregating people's
willingness to pay to protect them. What might be sought is a more deliberative judgment, based on the exchange of reasons that can be offered on behalf of one or another outcome." Perhaps the underlying
concern could be generalized to a range of benefits and amenities.
We should agree that there are many problems with the claim
that all goods, including other living creatures, should be valued by
aggregating private willingness to pay. But any method of valuation
will necessarily include the explicit or implicit assignment of monetary
values. Perhaps the assignment will or should come from democratic
deliberation rather than through aggregating private willingness to
pay, at least insofar as the Last Generation is considering its own future. But so long as any monetary assignment is made, discounting is
generally appropriate, because no one doubts that it is appropriate to
discount money.
V. INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY

A. The Basic Problem
The argument thus far has not explored the question of intergenerational equity. Of course the amounts spent by future generations
involve money, and at first glance that money must be discounted,
simply because it is money. But critics are correct to say that discounting might contribute to serious problems involving intergenerational
equity.'o The reason is that with discounting, a cost-benefit analysis can
lead the current generation to impose extremely high burdens and
67
See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 204-10 (Harvard 1993) (criticizing the valuation of endangered species and other environmental goods because it fails to capture how people value such goods outside the market context and because valuing the environment is not necessarily done out of self-interest or consumer demand).
68 See Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom 286-88 (Belknap 2002) (implying that people derive value from social goods even when they are not motivated by self-interest).
69 The status of (future) animals will, however, share some of the problems described in
connection with future generations.
70 See Revesz, 99 Columbia L Rev at 996-1002 (cited in note 8) (suggesting that intergenerational discounting is unethical because pure time preferences mean that the current generation will use the majority of the available resources for its own welfare).
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costs on future generations-leading to a net welfare loss, a serious
distributional problem, rights violations, or all three." To be sure, people might well have a pure time preference for money, choosing $100
today over the financially equivalent sum in a year.72 But a pure time
preference on the part of those now living cannot justify a discount
rate with respect to harms faced by people not yet born."
It is possible, of course, that even without much worrying about
its obligations to posterity, current generations will contribute a great
deal to their welfare. The course of human history, with astounding
improvements in wealth, health, and longevity, makes it more than
plausible to suggest that such contributions do occur over time.74 But
there is no assurance that they will continue to occur, in general or for
particular risks." Consider, for example, the problems of ozone depletion and climate change. The former problem once threatened, and the
latter now threatens, to impose catastrophic risks on those who will
come later." When the costs will be faced immediately, and the benefits enjoyed in the distant future, a cost-benefit analysis, based on discounting, can create genuine risks of both net welfare losses and distributional inequity.
71 See Portney and Weyant, Introduction at 6 (cited in note 13) (emphasizing the distributional problem and noting that "efficiency is hardly the only criterion that matters in policy
analysis").
72 As noted, a pure time preference is challenged as irrational in Cowen and Parfit, Against
the Social DiscountRate at 155 (cited in note 14). See also note 38 and accompanying text.
73 Id ("Pure time preference within a single life does not imply pure time preference across
different lives.").
74 See Vernon Smith, Expert Panel Ranking, in Bjorn Lomborg, ed, Global Crises, Global
Solutions 630,635 (Cambridge 2004) (stating that delay on global warming makes sense because of
future gains in wealth, science, and knowledge); Thomas Schelling, Expert Panel Ranking, in Lomborg, ed, Global Crises 627, 627 (arguing that it makes no sense for current generations to pay to
combat global warming because future generations will be "much richer" than current ones).
75 See Posner, Catastropheat 151-53 (cited in note 9) (arguing that inaction is not the right
course of action just because of uncertainty as to future capabilities and events); Robert C. Lind,
Analysis for IntergenerationalDecisionmaking, in Portney and Weyant, Discounting and IntergenerationalEquity at 173, 176 (cited in note 2) (arguing that there is no guarantee that current
generations will contribute to future generations).
76 See Cass R. Sunstein, Montreal vs. Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols 30 Harv Envir L Rev
(forthcoming 2007) (emphasizing intergenerational inequities that both problems yield because
the chemicals and gases produced "stay in the atmosphere for an extremely long time").
77 William Baumol suggests that a low discount rate, or even a zero discount rate, might
make sense in narrow circumstances, such as those in which the goal is to prevent environmental
damage that is both irreversible and potentially catastrophic. See Baumol, 58 Am Econ Rev at
801 (cited in note 9) (asserting that a high discount rate is appropriate in most situations, as "the
future can be left to take care of itself," but reserving low discount rates for "irreversiblities"). In
our view, this suggestion is best taken as an effort to protect future generations against unjustifiable losses as a result of the actions of the current generation. On this particular problem, see
Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic,91 Cornell L Rev 841, 894-96 (2006) (discussing
how law and policy should handle potentially irreversible and catastrophic events-in particular
how cost-benefit analyses should be adjusted in order to account for such events).
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It is not at all clear, however, that a refusal to discount is the best
way of reducing those risks. On the contrary, any such refusal might
well injure members of future generations. When the costs of regulation will be incurred in the distant future, and the benefits enjoyed
immediately, discounting can be actually quite helpful to future generations, because it ensures current investments that redound to their
benefit. And if present benefits will ultimately produce welfare gains
for future generations, a refusal to discount can be quite harmful; most
of the time, the future gains from the increased wealth of the present.7
It follows that the question of discounting should be separated
from the question of obligations to future generations. It is not productive to collapse those two questions. If cost-benefit analysis with
discounting imposes a serious loss on members of future generations,
the current generation should be asked to fulfill whatever moral obligations it has. A refusal to discount is a crude and possibly even perverse way of doing that.
B.

Methuselah, Paretoville, and Beyond

To see the relevant considerations, consider five problems. Of
these, the fourth and fifth are most important, but they are best understood in light of those that precede them.
1. Methuselah.
Suppose that society consists of only one person, who, it turns out,
will live for a great many years, even centuries. Let us call him Methuselah. Suppose that Methuselah will face a set of health risks (by hypothesis, none of them fatal) over time. Suppose that each risk of concern-those that involve a significant malady-is in the vicinity of

1/100, and that Methuselah is willing to pay $30,000 to eliminate each
of these risks. If Methuselah is paying to reduce those risks now, there
is no need to worry about discounting; the question is how much he is
willing to pay to reduce risks that will be 'aced imminently or some
time in the future. If Methuselah is assessing the present value of his
future expenditures, it is fully appropriate for him to discount those
78 See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 145 (cited in note 53) (noting that a high discount rate
means a high level of expected future productivity, and therefore a higher future income level; if
benefit values are adjusted appropriately, high discount rates should not dramatically reduce the
attractiveness of policies that benefit the future).
79 We are putting to one side debates about the (perhaps doubtful) contributions of economic growth to individual well-being. For a readable overview, see Robert H. Frank, Luxury

Fever: Money and Happiness in an Era of Excess 146-58 (Princeton 1999) ("[Tlhe conflict be-

tween individual and group [interests] is the single most important explanation of current consumption patterns.").
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expenditures, even if they will be for risk reductions. If a 1/100 risk will
be faced in 20 years, it is worth not $30,000, but $30,000 discounted to
present value. Methuselah can invest that discounted amount and
watch it grow.. Money is being discounted, not health -a restatement
of our conclusion in Part II.
This conclusion might be questioned if Methuselah is seen as a
series of selves extending over time and if an early self does not act as
an appropriate agent for the later one." It is possible that Methuselah
should be required to take steps to insure against serious harms in old
age, especially if bounded rationality, including self-control problems,
looms large. But if we indulge the not implausible assumption that
Methuselah, of all people (!), is a good agent for his later self, discounting is fully appropriate.
2. Paretoville.
Suppose that everyone in a small town, Paretoville, faces a current
risk of 1/100,000, and that every resident of Paretoville, having the same
tastes and the same amount of income and wealth, is willing to pay $50,
but no more, to eliminate that risk. (Suppose, too, that such residents
have been adequately informed and are not suffering from any kind of
bounded rationality.) The mayor of Paretoville takes this figure very
seriously, and decides not to eliminate risks of 1/100,000 if the cost of
doing so is greater than $50. Under the assumptions of adequate information and sufficient rationality,2 the mayor is reasonably using costbenefit analysis in deciding how to proceed, and there is no objection
from the standpoint of equity. The reason is that every member of Paretoville pays, in full, for risk reduction, and people should not be required to pay more than they wish unless there is a problem of inadequate information, bounded rationality, or harms to third parties." In
80 By itself, this argument rejects Revesz's claims about the appropriate treatment of latent
harms. See Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 984 (cited in note 8):
The reason for discounting in the case of latent harms is not that a regulator ... determines
that life in the future is less than life in the present. Instead, discounting simply reflects the
fact that the individual who is valuing her own life derives less utility from living a year in
the future than in the present.
81 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons at 302-06 (cited in note 14) (suggesting that imagining
different people throughout time as a series of "successive selves" helps in thinking about connectedness between generations).
See Sunstein, 54 Duke L J at 422-25 (cited in note 57) (arguing against forced exchanges
8
of money for risk reduction by the government, as individuals should be permitted to make their
own decisions regarding their welfare).
83
Id (highlighting the difference between this situation of equality and a situation where
the poor would be made worse off by being forced to use their limited resources on an unwanted
reduction in risk).
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some regulatory contexts, all three problems introduce serious complications,8 but we are assuming that they are absent in Paretoville.
For the citizens of Paretoville, the analysis of discounting is
straightforward. If expenditures must be made now to reduce risks
that will impose harm in the future, the mayor of Paretoville must ask
about current willingness to pay to avoid such risks; in all likelihood,
the figure will be less than $50. If the expenditures must be made in
the future, the relevant amounts should be discounted.
3. Dirtyville and Cleanville in Kaldorhicksiana.
Two towns, Dirtyville and Cleanville, are adjacent to one another
in the large and somewhat messy state of Kaldorhicksiana. Dirtyville
engages in polluting activity that produces $60 in benefits to each of
its 100,000 citizens. That activity creates a risk of 1/100,000, faced by
each of the 100,000 citizens of Cleanville. Each citizen of Cleanville is
willing to pay $50, but no more, to eliminate the risk of 1/100,000
caused by Dirtyville's polluting activity. On cost-benefit grounds, the
polluting activity should be allowed; its value is $6 million, which is
higher than its $5 million cost.
But this problem is different from Problem 2 because there is a
distributional issue: the citizens of Cleanville are uncompensated losers. If we were committed to economic efficiency, we would want the
polluting activity to continue, but the distributional problem complicates matters. And the problem may be worse still. Because monetized
figures rather than direct measurements of welfare are involved, it is
possible that the activity actually creates a net welfare loss, with the
citizens of Cleanville losing more, in welfare terms, than the citizens of
Dirtyville gain."' Suppose, for instance, that the citizens of Cleanville
are relatively poor, and hence their willingness to pay only $50 to
eliminate a risk of 1/100,000 is consistent with the conclusion that they
are facing a huge welfare loss from their subjection to that risk. The
relatively small amount each citizen is willing to pay-$50-reflects
the relative poverty of Cleanville, not a relatively small welfare loss.
On plausible assumptions, the state of Kaldorhicksiana, containing
these two towns, is not living up to its name, because the losers are not,
in welfare terms, losing less than the winners gain.

8
Id (providing examples of such complications, including workers' compensation programs, where "nonunionized workers faced a dollar-for-dollar wage reduction, corresponding
almost perfectly to the expected value of the benefits that they received").
85

See Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Pref-

erences Are Distorted, 29 J Legal Stud 1105, 1122-24 (2000) (discussing how measurement in
money, rather than direct welfare, points to a problem with the use of cost-benefit analysis).
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The welfare question could be tested, and the problem could be
made analytically equivalent to Problem 2, if the citizens of Dirtyville
could be forced to compensate those of Cleanville through law or
some process of bargaining. But let us suppose that this is not feasible.
In that event, we cannot be sure whether the efficient solution is also
the solution that promotes social welfare. An additional question, a
familiar one in regulatory policy, is whether there should be some kind
of equitable or distributional barrier to the use of cost-benefit balancing." If the citizens of Dirtyville are wealthy, and those of Cleanville
are poor, the barrier might well be justified, at least if there is no
mechanism by which the citizens of Cleanville can capture some of the
benefits of the activity.
Does this example seem fanciful? In fact many air pollution problems correspond to the tale of Dirtyville and Cleanville. As we shall
see, the problem of climate change has a similar feature insofar as
wealthy nations are imposing risks on poor ones-risks for whose
prevention poor citizens in poor nations are not willing to pay all that
much, even when they are gravely threatened.
4. Presentville and Futureville.
Presentville engages in polluting activity that produces $60 in
benefits to each of its 100,000 citizens. But the polluting activity does
not harm citizens of Presentville or any other current place. Instead, it
harms members of future generations. More particularly, the activity
creates a risk that will materialize in 100 years, in the town of Futureville-which, as it happens, is Presentville, a century from now and
much more populous. In that time, the one million citizens of Futureville will face a death risk of 1/10,000-meaning that 100 people are
expected to die. If the lives of the people of Futureville are valued at
$8 million each, it is clear that the polluting activity should stop, because $800 million is far greater than $6 million. But if money is discounted at an annual rate of 7 percent, each of their lives is worth only
$581, and hence the polluting activity should continue, because $6 million is far greater than $58,100.
But on what premises does it make sense to refuse a $6 million
(current) expenditure to save 100 future lives? If all the people of Presentville and Futureville were treated as a single person extending
over time, then the case would be similar to Methuselah's, and discounting would be appropriate. In that case, the various people would
86 See Portney and Weyant, Introduction at 6 (cited in note 13) (arguing that even if a
program passes a cost-benefit analysis it may nonetheless be objected to on distributional grounds,
as it may be efficient, yet still benefit only "the five richest families in the country").
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amount to just one person who could invest the relevant resources
and use them later. (Also, no one would die, because we're talking
about Methuselah.) It is tempting to suppose that if there were an
intergenerational negotiation between the people of Presentville and
the people of Futureville, discounting would be part of a mutually
beneficial trade.8 Here is the reason: the people of Presentville could
agree not to squander or to consume the benefits they receive, but
instead to invest a relevant sum and offer that amount to the people
of Futureville, making them better off on balance. Those who emphasize the opportunity costs of investments as a reason for discounting,
including OMB, implicitly appeal to the idea that future generations
will in fact benefit from the investments that current generations
make.m Hence discounting might be seen as a part of a (hypothetical)
mutually beneficial intergenerational negotiation.
But there are two problems with relying on that idea. The first is
conceptual: what is the set of background entitlements against which
this purely hypothetical negotiation is occurring? At first glance, the
people of Presentville are literally dictators. They can decide to consume all existing resources, to ruin the environment, to impoverish
posterity, even to remain childless and not create later generations at
all. In the (hypothetical) negotiating process, are the people of Presentville permitted to threaten the (hypothetical) people of Futureville with nonexistence? If so, how much will Futureville be able to
extract? If not, is this because hypothetical people have some entitlement to be permitted to exist? (How many of them?) And if Presentville merely threatens Futureville with impoverishment and desperation, the people of Futureville will be in a singularly weak position to
extract protection against (say) individual risks of death of 1/100,000.
In short, the idea of a mutually beneficial deal raises serious conceptual difficulties. At the very least, it is necessary to identify some
entitlements on the part of both Presentville and Futureville, setting
87 See Dexter Samida and David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting, 74 U
Chi L Rev 145, 153 (2007):
An alternative version of equality would give the first generation approximately 80 units
[out of 100 total] and the rest to the second generation (giving each one an endowment of
that amount in the first year of its life). When the second generation's endowment of 20 is
invested at 3 percent for the first 50 years, it will grow to about 80 units in year 51, generating an equal division of the resources.

See also Lind, Analysis for Intergenerational Decisionmaking at 176-77 (cited in note 75) ("In

theory, this could be done in a world with overlapping generations In practice, this is virtually
impossible, in part because of the problem of getting and enforcing the commitment of intervening generations to carry out this intergenerational transfer.").
8
See, for example, Lind, Analysis for Intergenerational Decisionmaking at 176-77 (cited in
note 75).
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the background against which they might bargain. To be plausible, any
such specification will inevitably have to depend on an independent
normative account of some kind, and that independent account, rather
than a notion of intergenerational bargaining as such, will be doing
the crucial work."
The second problem is pragmatic. Suppose, as is plausible, that
there is no mechanism to ensure that any mutually beneficial bargain
will be enforceable; the citizens of Presentville might simply consume
their resources instead." To be sure, the problem could be solved with
compensation, and the discounted value of the 100 future deaths
should be used if Futureville will sufficiently benefit from the investment of that sum (by, for example, producing significant decreases in
premature deaths). If so, the case would be quite similar to Problem 2
(back to Paretoville). But as we have noted, there is no assurance that
this will be the case."
It should be clear that Presentville is neither Methuselah nor
Paretoville. But with cost-benefit analysis with discounting, the problem of Presentville and Futureville has many features in common with
that of Cleanville and Dirtyville. In the case of Kaldorhicksiana, the
use of cost-benefit analysis can create distributional problems, and it
can even lead to an aggregate welfare loss; in the case of Presentville
and Futureville, cost-benefit analysis with discounting may create
those same problems. But the case of Presentville and Futureville
nonetheless raises distinct questions: What does the present owe the
future? Is the present obliged to compensate the future for the injuries it causes? What does the idea of "compensation" mean in this con-

89
Hence John Rawls rejects the idea of intergenerational bargaining in favor of a just
savings principle. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 287-88 (Columbia 1993) (asserting that
social contracts "are bound to be substantially affected by contingencies and accidents"). For
further discussion see note 103.
9o See Portney and Weyant, Introduction at 6 (cited in note 13) ("Even if it is efficient to
reject a climate protection program, .. .one might reasonably object to this decision on distributional grounds, especially if one is dubious that [ ] compensation will actually be available to

future generations."); Lind, Analysis for IntergenerationalDecisionmaking at 176-77 (cited in

note 75) ("We are so used to assuming the ability to transfer resources over time we sometimes
forget that if we can't, then it's not appropriate to convert all flows to a present value."); Cowen
and Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate at 151-52 (cited in note 14) (arguing that it is a
mistake to think benefits will be reinvested rather than simply consumed). Donohue defends
discounting on the ground that it "is appropriate in that, if invested, our resources are expected
to grow at [the stated] rate, so that if we forego spending and invest the money instead, we can
save more lives in the future with the amount foregone today." Donohue, 108 Yale L J at 1905
(cited in note 13) (rejecting the notion that discounting reflects a lower valuation of future lives
in a moral or ethical sense). The problem with this argument is that it assumes that Problem 4 is
the same as Problem 1-that society is a kind of giant Methuselah, which it clearly is not.
91 See Lind, Analysis for IntergenerationalDecisionmaking at 176-77 (cited in note 75).
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text? We will shortly return to these questions and their connection to
the practice of discounting.
5.

Reality.

Turn now to a more realistic example, involving climate change.'
Suppose, as is plausible, that the primary victims of climate change will
include poor people in India and Africa." Suppose that the planners
concerned with climate change decide what to do by engaging in costbenefit analysis and discounting the victims' costs to present value. If
so, such victims will not be much helped, because no one is planning to
invest the discounted sum to create a fund to compensate them in the
future. The result of relying solely on cost-benefit analysis with discounting may be serious welfare losses, distributional unfairness, or
both. To be sure, technological innovations might mean that what we
see as likely deaths, or many of them, will end up as mere illnesses
(and perhaps minor illnesses at that). But this possibility does not justify discounting. It is instead an effort to deny that the anticipated
harms will be as large as we project. If that number is inflated, then of
course the analysis must change.
It is also true that future generations are likely to be wealthier
than our own, and hence it might not make much sense for the relatively poor present to transfer resources to the relatively rich future.9
This would be a perverse form of redistribution. If future generations
can be expected to be richer, that point must be part of the analysis of
what equity requires. And if future generations can be expected to be
richer, their anticipated wealth is produced by some combination of
the efforts, investments, and altruism of their predecessors-a point
that compounds the concern about perverse redistribution.
But even here, there are complications. Suppose, for example,
that a relatively poor community is gaining $6 million as a result of
activity that will cause 100 deaths in a relatively wealthy community. Is
92 See Posner, Catastrophe at 151-52 (cited in note 9) (considering how, through discounting, an investment in climate protection may not seem efficient, and countering that there is no
other realistic alternative because creating and maintaining a fund for the compensation of
future global warming victims is highly unlikely).
93 See William D. Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Warming the World: Economic Models of
Global Warming 91 (MIT 2000) (showing especially large losses in India and Africa). See also
generally J. Timmons Roberts and Bradley C. Parks, Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality,
North-South Politics, and Climate Policy (MIT 2006) (exploring normative and empirical issues

raised by the distributional effects of climate change, with its severe impact on poor nations);
Stern Review at 104-05 (cited in note 29).
94 See Schelling, Expert Panel Ranking at 627 (cited in note 74) ("One must deduct the
growth rate from the discount rate, since it is essential to assume overall growth in per capita
income (global GDP).").
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the activity justified merely because poorer people are obtaining the
benefit, which by hypothesis is much smaller than the cost? That claim
would be exceedingly difficult to defend. The most general pointsuggested by the problem of Presentville and Futureville-is that costbenefit analysis with discounting can indeed produce serious problems
across generations, including a net welfare loss and distributional unfairness. In the case of climate change, these problems need to be considered, and they suggest that we might well reject the path suggested
by cost-benefit analysis with a standard discount rate.
Responding to concerns of this sort, Thomas Schelling argues that
"[g]reenhouse gas abatement is a foreign aid program, not a savinginvestment problem of the familiar kind."9' For long-term problems, it
might be thought that the question is whether the current generation
should provide "foreign aid" to posterity. And to the extent that posterity is likely to be wealthier than we are, there is a serious question
whether such aid should be provided. As Schelling suggests, citizens of
the developed world are not now willing to make especially significant
sacrifices to help people in poor nations; it would seem extremely
unlikely that in the context of climate change, such citizens would be
willing to make significant sacrifices to assist people in those same
nations in the distant and probably less-poor future.
But Schelling's analogy has serious problems. In our example, Futureville is not merely a foreign country. It consists to a large extent of
Presentville's own descendents, and the risks they face are a direct
result of Presentville's own actions-both plausible reasons to think
that Futureville might have special obligations towards Presentville.
The problem of climate change is closely analogous. The idea of "foreign aid" is a singularly poor fit for that problem, in which environmental and health risks in some Futurevilles are a product of actions
undertaken knowingly (and perhaps negligently) by some Presentvilles. In that event, the present might well be seen to have committed
a kind of tort, and the claim for compensation is hardly a claim for
some kind of subsidy, or "aid.".
To give a stark example, imagine that present generations plant a
bomb that will explode in two centuries. Is this a violation of the obli95 Thomas Schelling, Intergenerational Discounting, in Portney and Weyant, Discounting
and Intergenerational Equity 99,100 (cited in note 2).

96 Id at 100-01 (asserting that discounting is appropriate because it represents a choice to
help those who are relatively poorer, the current generation, rather than those who will be relatively richer, future generations).
97 Id at 101 (maintaining that it is inappropriate to consider investments in environmental
protection as an issue of "investing now to reap future benefits," as those who will benefit will
likely live in a different part of the world and be relatively richer than those doing the investing).
98 See Roberts and Parks, Climate of Injustice at 1-2 (cited in note 93).
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gation to provide "foreign aid"? Environmental problems are rarely
bombs, for they are usually not created with malice or with destructive
goals; but if they result from activities that are projected to create
risks, they must be analyzed in the general terms of tort law. This point
has important implications for climate change, because the risks, faced
above all by poor nations, are a result of actions from which wealthier
nations have benefited.
C. Not Discounting as a Crude Response to the
Intergenerational Problem
1. Discounting and moral obligations to posterity.
Suppose that the present generation believes that it has moral obligations to its successors, either because those successors will be our
children's children, or because whoever they are, they will be injured
by our actions. The point that we seek to emphasize here is that refusing to discount is not a good way of fulfilling these obligations." Indeed, any such refusal might well hurt posterity. The moral obligation
is best discharged not by a zero discount rate, but by asking the current generation to do what it is morally obliged to do.
A refusal to discount, often justified as a way of assisting the future,m is a singularly crude way of attempting to fulfill our obligations
to future generations. There are two problems. The first is that if the
refusal to discount will result in the postponement of protective programs, environmental and otherwise, the future is to that extent hurt
rather than helped.' The second is that if the consequence of dis99 See Samida and Weisbach, 74 U Chi L Rev at 154 (cited in note 87) ("[W]e care about
equality of well-being while those arguing against discounting are arguing for an equal division
of current resources, which will inevitably lead to an inequality in well-being."). See also Cowen
and Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate at 158-59 (cited in note 14) (suggesting that while
remoteness in time is not a reason to care less about social harms, it might make sense to take
account of the possibility that "it would be cheaper now to ensure compensation"). William
Nordhaus provides a powerful argument against responding to the ethically unacceptable consequences of cost-benefit analysis by altering discount rates, on the view that "[aid hoc manipulation of discount rates is a very poor substitute for policies that focus directly on the ultimate
objective." William D. Nordhaus, Discounting and Public Policies That Affect the Distant Future

at 158 (cited in note 50) (contending that "there is no simple formula for modifying discount
rates that incorporates long-term objectives in an efficient manner").
100 See Ackerman and Heinzerling, 150 U Pa L Rev at 1570-71 (cited in note 15) (asserting
that discounting does not make sense in environmental law, an area of law that is distinctive
because of its focus on the future); Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 987-1007 (cited in note 8) (arguing against intergenerational discounting, as it could produce a world where "practically no
current expenditure for the benefit of relatively distant generations could be justified within a
cost-benefit framework").
101See Keeler and Cretin, 29 Mgmt Sci at 303-04 (cited in note 24) ("For any attractive
program, there is always a superior delayed program that should be funded first. The result is
that no program with a finite starting date can be selected.").
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counting is to reduce investments, economic and otherwise, that will
lead to long-term prosperity, then discounting is hardly helpful to future generations, which greatly benefit from economic growth."' It follows that the moral obligations of current generations should be uncoupled from the question of discounting, because neither discounting
nor refusing to discount is an effective way of ensuring that those obligations are fulfilled. The moral issues should be investigated directly,
and they should be disentangled from the practice of discounting.
2. Theory.
We have argued that future generations might well have a legitimate complaint if current generations follow the path indicated by
cost-benefit analysis with discounting. But what kind of complaint do
they have? To answer that question, it is necessary to say something
about the nature of intergenerational equity.
As we have suggested, it is tempting to think of ethical obligations in compensatory terms, as in the idea that ethical obligations are
satisfied if the present can make it worthwhile for future generations
to run the risks to which it subjects them. But this idea turns out to be
a false start because it is hard to know what the idea of compensation
means in this context. Must the present compensate the future for
each particular risk? That conclusion would be implausible. Surely it
would be acceptable to impose a risk of 1/100,000 on 10 million future
people if the very step that imposes that risk also eliminates a 1/1,000
risk that would be faced by 800 million future people (including the 10
million future people subjected to a new 1/100,000 risk of death). At
first glance, then, the goal should be to produce an overall "risk package" for which adequate compensation has been paid. But to what,
exactly, is this overall risk package being compared? To a situation in
which future generations face extreme poverty and catastrophic climate
change? To a situation in which future generations do not exist at all?
Do members of future generations have rights to exist? These questions
are closely connected with the difficulty of specifying the background
entitlements against which any hypothetical bargaining occurs.
102 Complications are outlined in Frank, Luxury Fever at 72-73 (cited in note 79) (noting
that economic growth does not increase self-reported life satisfaction).
103 Note too that Rawls's "just savings" principle would be satisfied by less than full compensation. The reason is that it is possible to imagine, without full compensation for risks, a system of savings that will bring "about the full realization of just institutions and the equal liberties," with particular reference to the "standpoint of the least advantaged of each generation."
Rawls, Political Liberalism at 287-88 (cited in note 89) ("[A]ny benchmark of comparison between the relative advantages of citizens must be founded on their present relationships and the
way in which social institutions work now, and not on how the actual ... historical sequence of
transactions extending backward over generations has improved (or would improve) everyone's
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In short, it is necessary to identify the baseline against which any
"compensation" must be paid, and the real work is being done by that
baseline, not by the idea of compensation. The baseline must come
from a more general account of the ethical obligations owed by the
present to the future -and hence we are not speaking of compensation at all. What might that account require? Some people believe that
current generations are obliged not to make the environment worse
than it is today' On this view, current generations are environmental
trustees. As such, they must follow a kind of environmental nondegradation principle. But there is a problem with this position, which is its
selective focus on environmental quality. Suppose that the current
generation sacrifices a remote island, but that as a direct result of that
action, it is able to confer significant economic, medical, and other
benefits on posterity, giving them healthier, longer, and better lives. Is
it so clear that the sacrifice is morally unacceptable?
John Rawls emphasizes a more promising approach, embodied in
a "just savings" principle, to be chosen by people behind a veil of ignorance in which "they do not know to which generation they belong or,
what comes to the same thing, the stage of civilization of their society."a6
The key point, for Rawls, is the extension of the device of the veil of
ignorance to the intergenerational question. Rawls also contends that
his conception of justice as fairness ought to inform choices behind the
circumstances."). Indeed, it is possible to imagine situations in which full compensation might
well be too demanding. Suppose, for example, that the result of full compensation would be to
impoverish the most disadvantaged members of the current generation, in order to ensure compensation to the already-wealthy members of future generations. Current generations might, in
principle, be able to claim that full compensation is not necessary when the distributive consequences are perverse. In fact, this claim raises some causal and even conceptual difficulties: If
future generations are significantly wealthier than past generations, their wealth is partly attributable to the actions and omissions of their predecessors. Once the causal chains have been
sorted out, we might well conclude that adequate compensation has been paid for any risks,
taken not separately but as a whole.
10 For an influential view, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 284-93 (Belknap revised ed
1999) ("The present generation cannot do as it pleases but is bound by the principles that would
be chosen in the original position to define justice between persons at different moments of
time."). For a helpful overview, see Lukas Meyer, IntergenerationalJustice, in Edward N. Zalta,
ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online at http://plato.stanford.edularchives/

sum2003/entries/justice-intergenerationall (visited Jan 23, 2007) ("The special features of our
relations to (remote) future people -especially the lack of particular knowledge, the impossibility of cooperation, and the permanent asymmetry of influence-do not stand in the way of attributing rights to them that ground corresponding duties owed by us.").
10 See Edith Brown Weiss, IntergenerationalEquity: A Legal Frameworkfor Global Environmental Change, in Edith Brown Weiss, ed, Environmental Change and InternationalLaw: New

Challenges and Dimensions 385, 390-93 (United Nations University 1991) (discussing several
international agreements that "have contained language indicating either a concern for sustainable use of the environment or a concern for future generations").
106 Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 254 (cited in note 104) (contending that a veil of ignorance
is the only way to truly consider what a fair exchange would look like).
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veil. What is required, on his view, is a system of savings that will bring
about "the full realization of just institutions and the equal liberties,"'O
with close attention to the "standpoint of the least advantaged of each
generation."" Under this approach, cost-benefit analysis with discounting will create serious problems from the standpoint of justice if it leads
to decisions that (for example) impose especially grave hardships on
the most disadvantaged members of future societies. The proper response would be to take steps to conform to the just savings principle.
On this view, for example, it would be unacceptable to refuse to
take steps to protect against climate change if the refusal would lead
to a violation of equal liberties, or if it meant that the least advantaged
members of future generations would suffer extreme hardship, well
beyond that of the least advantaged members of the current generation. On the other hand, the current generation would not be required
to take protective measures that would produce hardship for its least
advantaged members, if those least advantaged members are more
disadvantaged than would be any other group in any future generation, even in the absence of those protective measures. (Suppose, for
example, that serious efforts to reduce greenhouse gases would be
extremely expensive, and that the expense would have to be borne in
part by the most disadvantaged members of current generations.) And
indeed, some debates over climate change devote attention to issues
of exactly this sort."
In a later treatment, Rawls suggests that it is unhelpful to "imagine a (hypothetical and nonhistorical) direct agreement between all
generations.,no Instead the parties, behind the veil of ignorance, might
be "required to agree to a savings principle subject to the further condition that they must want all previous generations to have followed
it."" This savings principle has the advantage of treating all generations the same, through a form of intergenerational neutrality that
protects against the dual problems of impoverishing the present and
impoverishing the future. On Rawls's approach, policies that harmed
the most disadvantaged members of current generations for the sake
of the future would likely be disfavored, and the question would be
107 Id at 257 (declining to extend this to the proposition that justice requires that "early
generations save so that later ones are simply more wealthy").
108 Id at 258.
109 See, for example, Indur Goklany, The Precautionary Principle 85-87 (Cato Institute

2002) (discussing how the "precautionary principle" counsels against assuming an overly aggressive strategy in combating greenhouse gases, as this could harm the current generation and
thereby "retard increases in global wealth").
110Rawls, Political Liberalism at 274 (cited in note 89) (discussing the need for "just savings"
between generations, as "society is a system of cooperation between generations over time").
Ill

Id.
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whether those policies were necessary to protect the most disadvantaged members of future generations from still greater harm (as, on
one view, is the case for emissions of greenhouse gases 2).
Rawls's own approach is not utilitarian or welfarist, but it would
be easy to adapt the idea of a veil of ignorance, and the notion of intergenerational neutrality,"' for welfarist purposes. From the welfarist
point of view, the goal should be to maximize welfare over time; welfarists would require current generations to give members of future
generations the same moral weight that they give to existing people.
Hence the current generation violates its ethical responsibilities if it
engages in projects that lead to net welfare losses, measured after including the interests of all generations (where interests themselves are
given equal weight). Of course this approach raises many puzzles; for
example, do we focus on the average welfare of those in future generations, or do we focus on aggregate welfare, in which case large populations are better by virtue of their size?
However such puzzles are resolved, we believe that the idea of a
veil of ignorance is appealing, and that it points in the right directions.
But the aim here is to sketch rather than to solve the problem of intergenerational equity. Behind the veil, discounting would often be
chosen because it would help future generations as well as the present
one. When discounting would not be chosen, it is because it would
have a harmful effect on the most disadvantaged people (on Rawls's
difference principle), or because it would reduce overall welfare (on a
welfarist approach). But it would be much better to focus directly on
intergenerational equity, and to explore how present generations
should fulfill their obligations independently of the question of discounting. While cost-benefit analysis with discounting can violate
principles of intergenerational equity, refusing to discount is not the
right way to satisfy those principles. Whatever the proper approach to
intergenerational equity, the debate over that issue should be separated from the debate over discounting, and the former debate should
be engaged directly.
3. Conclusions.
Some simple conclusions follow from this analysis. Cost-benefit
analysis with discounting can produce serious distributional problems
112 See Posner, Catastrophe at 151-53 (cited in note 9) (highlighting the example of greenhouse gases, which has an increased annual cost over time).
113 On intergenerational neutrality, see Stern Review at 31 (cited in note 29) ("[I]f a future
generation will be present, we suppose that it has the same claim on our ethical attention as the
current one."). See also generally Cass R. Sunstein, Worst-Case Scenarios (forthcoming Harvard
2007).
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and can easily lead to a net welfare loss. The proper response is to take
steps to ensure that present generations do not violate their obligations to posterity. On an optimistic view, no special steps are necessary.
Some combination of market forces and ordinary altruism tends to
ensure that those who come later are, in all relevant respects, significantly better off than those who came before."
But perhaps the optimistic view is unrealistic for some problems,
such as climate change. Suppose that climate change imposes truly
catastrophic losses on the world as a whole, or at least on the most vulnerable members of the most vulnerable nations."' And even if the
losses from climate change are not catastrophic, it would be surprising if
the gains from refusing to spend money on greenhouse gas emissions
will turn out to be used for the protection of those who are most likely
to suffer from greenhouse gas emissions. Under plausible assumptions,
the current generation should take self-conscious steps to protect its
successors from the effects of climate change, no less than from the effects of ozone depletion. Our goal is not to specify the mechanisms by
which the current generation fulfills that obligation, but to suggest that
whether or not the optimistic view is right, a refusal to discount is not
the appropriate response to the risk of intergenerational inequity.
D. A Note on Sustainable Development
In recent years, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the
topic of "sustainable development," an idea that has considerable
force in international law.116 Unfortunately, the idea of sustainability
remains poorly defined. An influential report suggests that development is sustainable if it "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs""'
114 See Shelling, Expert Panel Ranking at 627 (cited in note 74) ("Future generations will be
much richer than current ones, and it thus makes no sense to make current generations 'pay' for
the problems of future generations."); Schelling, Intergenerational Discounting at 101 (cited in
note 95) (arguing that, for this reason, investments for the benefit of the future must be considered as taking something from the poor to give to the rich).

115 See Stern Review at ii-viii, 57, 62--84 (cited in note 29); Posner, Catastrophe at 43-58

(cited in note 9).
116 See generally Alan Oxley, Environmental Protection and the WTO, in Julian Morris, ed,
Sustainable Development 123 (Profile Books 2002) (discussing the potential impact of multilateral environmental agreements on World Trade Organization rules); Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at
1009-14 (cited in note 8) (assessing sustainable development and its use in international agreements). See generally Sylvie Faucheux, David Pearce, and John L. Proops, Introduction, in
Faucheux, Pearce, and Proops, Models of Sustainable Development at 1, 3-16 (cited in note 51)
(discussing four models of sustainable development that have implications for international policy).
117 See World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future 43
(Oxford 1987) (emphasizing the two key concepts within sustainable development: needs, particularly those of the poor, and limitations on the environment's ability to meet those needs).
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-a formulation that is vaguer than, but not so far from, Rawls's just
savings principle. Robert Solow defines sustainability to require each
generation to have the capacity to attain the same levels of welfare as
those that preceded it."' For the environmental context, this definition
means that nonrenewable resources must be used so as not to make it
impossible for future generations to acquire the same standard of living."' Focusing specifically on the environment, Edith Brown Weiss
argues that each generation has a duty not to make the environmental
quality of the planet worse and also to preserve the essential options
available to future generations.
These specifications are contentious, for reasons that should be
clear from the discussion thus far. But if the idea of sustainable development is designed to require present generations to pay close attention to the interests of those who will follow, it points in the right directions and may have considerable practical importance. Of course
most people are willing to sacrifice their own well-being for the benefit of their children, and as we have noted, the arc of human history
suggests that the standard of living increases over time in any case.
But for some goods, including some environmental amenities, longterm losses are possible unless steps are taken to avoid them; climate
change in particular threatens to impose large-scale risks on posterity.12' The idea of sustainable development can be seen as a reminder
of the moral obligations of the present.
To the extent that the idea of sustainable development is meant
to require a specific policy of preserving environmental goods, it offers
a useful suggestion that current actions can produce short-run economic benefits while also creating long-term environmental problems.
The suggestion is especially important in the face of potentially irre118

Robert Solow, An Almost Practical Step toward Sustainability, 19 Resources Policy 162,

168 (1993) (arguing that "sustainability is not always compatible with discounting the well-being
of future generations if there is no continuing technological progress").
119 Id at 163 ("If 'sustainability' is anything more than a slogan or expression of emotion, it
must amount to an injunction to preserve productive capacity for the indefinite future.").
120 Weiss, Intergenerational Equity at 385 (cited in note 105) (asserting that fulfilling the
needs of the present generation efficiently is not enough to ensure equity across generations).
Brown's account, like Solow's, goes well beyond what is required by Rawls's just savings principle. On the relevance of options, see Sunstein, 91 Cornell L Rev at 855-68 (cited in note 77)
("When regulators are dealing with an irreversible loss, and when they are uncertain about the
timing and likelihood of that loss, they should be willing to pay a sum-the option value-to
maintain flexibility for the future.").
121 See Stern Review at 56-167 (cited in note 29) (outlining effects of unchecked climate
change); Posner, Catastrophe at 151-52 (cited in note 9) (stating that global warming will have
potentially drastic consequences if no action is taken to abate it); Nordhaus and Boyer, Warming
the World at 71 (cited in note 93) (asserting that catastrophic risks resulting from global warming
have not been adequately studied and advocating willingness to pay as a measure of the value of
preventing future climate change).
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versible environmental change.' But environmental protection can
burden the future too, especially if it is extremely costly, and there is
no abstract reason to believe that preserving a particular environmental amenity (a forest, a lake) is always better for posterity than
other investments that do not involve the environment in particular
(expenditures on basic research, reductions in national debt). The appropriate conclusion is that an emphasis on sustainable development
must be taken as a placeholder for a set of conclusions, requiring
specification and independent justification, about what intergenerational equity requires.
E.

Implications

What are the implications for reviewing courts and for regulatory
practice? The question of judicial review is the easiest to handle.
Courts are correct to require some kind of rationale for any particular
discount rate (including a discount rate of zero).2 An implausibly high
discount rate (say, 8 percent) would have to be explained, as would an
implausibly low one (say, 0.2 percent). But the great complexity of the
underlying issues, and the continued existence of reasonable disagreement, argue for a cautious judicial role, especially because of the
risk that judicial invalidations will simply stall desirable regulation.12
Of course extreme cases can be imagined.' Suppose that an agency
refuses to discount the monetary value of health and safety benefits
and that future generations are not involved. If so, it would be reasonable to rule that the agency's refusal is arbitrary, and perhaps any re122 See Sunstein, 91 Cornell L Rev at 855-62 (cited in note 77) (advocating paying a premium to maintain flexibility for being able to prevent irreversible environmental harm in the
future); Posner, Catastrophe at 162 (cited in note 9) (discussing how irreversibilities, such as
global warming, will require more resources to control in the future than in the present); Ken-

neth Arrow, Discounting,Morality, and Gaming, in Portney and Weyant, eds, Discounting and

IntergenerationalEquity 13, 17-20 (cited in note 2) (exploring the idea of irreversible investments, which "yield benefits to the distant future," yet "either cannot be plundered by intervening generations or will yield relatively little if they do try to interfere").
123 See Northern California Power Agency v FERC, 37 F3d 1517, 1522-23 (DC Cir 1994)
(concluding that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's choice to apply a uniform 15
percent discount rate to all applications for new licenses for hydroelectric projects in California
was proper); Natural Resources Defense Council v Herrington, 768 F2d 1355, 1410-14 (DC Cir

1985) (rejecting the Department of Energy's choice of a 10 percent discount rate in developing
standards because the rate was "fatally unexplained").
124 See Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst, The Struggle For Auto Safety 5,246 (Belknap 1990)
(arguing that judicial regulation should be delayed until the enforcement stage, because this
"limits dysfunctional incentives to procrastinate and to litigate, places decision making in the
hands of the best-informed parties,... and limits the disruptive effects of judicial remedies").
125 The cost-benefit analysis for arsenic is an example. See 66 Fed Reg at 6976, 7012 (cited in
note 42) (discussing the monetized value of benefits resulting from reducing arsenic in drinking
water).
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sulting regulation should be struck down if the refusal to discount is
responsible for its content. Or suppose that an agency paid no attention to the interests of those after 2050, or that it adopted a discount
rate of 10 percent. But across a wide range of agency choices, judicial
deference is the best general orientation.
Our discussion provides considerable support for OMB's general
posture of requiring the same discount rate for all costs and benefits."
It does so not on OMB's unruly and complex rationale,127 but on the
ground that for latent harms, what is being discounted is money and
not risks to life and health as such. To the extent that regulations will
mostly affect currently living people, a uniform discount rate is fully
appropriate. Unfortunately, agencies have not always followed OMB's
guidance with respect to discount rates.'" On this issue, at least, they
ought to do so.
The analysis must be more complicated when planners are affecting the welfare of future generations -as, for example, in the assessments of values associated with protection against climate change or
depletion of the ozone layer. Some people argue in favor of, or use, a
uniform discount rate for such values.'" Nothing said here demonstrates that a uniform discount rate is always wrong; and in the context
of ozone depletion, cost-benefit analysis with discounting justified
extremely aggressive measures to protect future generations." But we
126 See OMB, Circular A-4 at 33-34 (cited in note 3) (setting out a discount rate of 7 percent for regulations whose main effects are "to displace or alter the use of capital in the private
sector," and a discount rate of 3 percent for regulations "primarily and directly affecting private
consumption") We do not attempt here to endorse any particular discount rate, and certainly not to
suggest that the 7 percent figure, which seems badly outmoded, is an appropriate one. See note 125.
127 See id ("[T]he analytically preferred method of handling temporal differences between
benefits and costs is to adjust all benefits and costs to reflect their value in equivalent units of
consumption and to discount them at the rate consumers and savers would normally use in
discounting future consumption benefits.").
128 See Morrison, Comment, 65 U Chi L Rev at 1366-67 (cited in note 6) (demonstrating
that different agencies employ a variety of discount rates). Again, we have not attempted to
identify the appropriate discount rate, and hence have not taken a position on the two options
suggested by OMB: 7 percent and 3 percent. The former figure is, however, far higher than the
current return on risk-neutral investments, and for this reason it is not easy to defend.
129 See, for example, Nordhaus and Boyer, Warming the World at 112 (cited in note 93)
(stressing that the discount rate should be the same across regions and temporally, but not specifying the appropriate rate).
130 See Sunstein, 30 Harv Envir L Rev (cited in note 76) (arguing that the different costbenefit assessments done for the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols explain why the Montreal Protocol has been successful, while the Kyoto Protocol has not); Stephen J. DeCanio, Economic

Analysis, Environmental Policy, and IntergenerationalJustice in the Reagan Administration: The
Case of the Montreal Protocol, in 3 International EnvironmentalAgreements: Politics Law and

Economics 299, 308-13 (2003) (detailing how the Reagan Administration and the framers of the
Montreal Protocol were able to use economic analysis, combined with a principle of intergenerational neutrality, to bolster investment in ozone layer protection).
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have emphasized that for such problems as climate change, costbenefit analysis with the usual discount rate can produce both welfare
losses and serious unfairness."' In this context, social planners should
not base their decisions solely on such analysis with discounting; the
result of such analysis may be badly wrong. Any judgments about appropriate regulations must be accompanied by steps fulfilling the present generation's moral obligations to the future.
The tasks of conducting cost-benefit analysis for climate change,
and of incorporating an appropriate discount rate, raise many challenges, and we do not attempt in this space to meet those challenges.
For combating the harms produced by climate change, a separate fund
for the assistance of those most at risk, accompanying reductions in
greenhouse gases, may well be a good place to start. Such a fund could
be used to promote further reductions and also to help nations that most
suffer from climate change-by, for example, furnishing technological
assistance or otherwise facilitating adaptations to hotter climates.'32
Of course creation of a fund does not answer the question of its
magnitude, and it says nothing about the appropriate size of emissions
reductions. It is also possible that the feasible steps to assist adaptation would not be adequate, and that aggressive prevention is therefore preferable. Our only claim is that the question of obligations to
future generations must be answered directly.
VI. CONCLUSION
The debate over discounting regulatory benefits has become both
vigorous and exceedingly complicated. In our view, both advocates
and critics of discounting have neglected a central point. If the question involves latent harms, the initial issue is how much people are
willing to pay to prevent those harms. There is a difference between
cases in which people are now being asked about their willingness to
pay current amounts for future harms (a question that can be asked
without any government discounting at all) and cases in which future
willingness to pay is involved. So long as monetary values are assigned
to the relevant variables, it is only money, and not any variable, that is
being discounted. If a discount rate is properly applied to money, it is
properly applied to the future money that public or private actors are
willing to devote to regulatory benefits. There is no need for a separate assessment of the discount rate applied to latent harms. What is
being discounted is the money that is used to combat those harms.
131 See Posner, Catastrophe at 151-52 (cited in note 9) ("A discount rate based on market
interest rates tends to obliterate the interest of remote future generations.").
132 Possible approaches are discussed in detail in Stern Review at 308-568 (cited in note 29).
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In many respects, agency valuations of latent harms may be too
low-perhaps because they do not consider national income growth,
133
perhaps because cancer risks deserve particular attention, perhaps
because they do not include the valuations of those whose friends and
family members are at risk." But as a general rule, it should not be
controversial to apply the monetary discount rate to monetized regulatory benefits, simply because no one doubts that money should be
discounted.'3

It is true that cost-benefit analysis with discounting, no less than
cost-benefit analysis of any kind, can produce a net welfare loss, significant distributional difficulties, or both. For this reason, decisions
based on that form of analysis can create severe ethical problems. But
a refusal to discount might well fail to solve those problems. It might
even aggravate them, either by impoverishing the present (to the detriment of the future) or by requiring the delay of life-saving programs
(also to the detriment of the future). Current generations do owe
moral duties to posterity, and it is important to prevent actions that
impose serious losses on those who will follow. But the problem of
intergenerational equity should be engaged directly. It should not be
conflated with the question of discounting.

133 See James K. Hammitt and Jin-Tan Liu, Effects of Disease Type and Latency on the Value
of Mortality Risk, 28 J Risk & Uncertainty 73,80 (2004) ("The value of preventing a fatal cancer is
often considered to be greater than the value of preventing a fatal trauma in a workplace or transportation accident."); Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 972-73 (cited in note 8) (arguing that analysts
undervalue cancer risks because they underestimate the morbidity that precedes mortality and they
undervalue the "dread" factor). Some people, however, have expressed skepticism about the argu-

ment for adjustments See EPA, An SAB Report on EPA's White Paper Valuing the Benefits of Fatal

Cancer Risk Reduction (July 27, 2000) online at http://www.epa.gov/sciencel/pdf/eeacf013.pdf (visited Jan 23, 2007) ("[Tlhe Committee does not believe that the current literature supports adjustments to the VSL for differences in age, health status, or risk aversion.").
134 See Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U Chi L Rev 537,539-40
(2004) (emphasizing the need to consider those valuations and noting that "[t]ort law has long
focused on the compensation of those still living," while "regulatory policy ... is concerned above
all with producing the right deterrent signal, a concern that might seem to explain the use of a
single, uniform number for the valuation of what matters most: the loss of life").
135 As we have noted, bounded rationality, especially in the form of hyperbolic discounting,
may suggest that people's valuations must be adjusted.
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